Syria: from insurgency to outright intervention?

Today I was pointed to a leaked early 2012 Stratfor email, with minutes from a meeting between people from the US air force strategic studies group and a Stratfor employee, which pretty much sums up my impression of US and allied powers’ conflict timetable in Syria:
1. Grind down the Syrian government’s defence by supporting the emergence and operations of a formidable rebel force:
„I kept pressing on the question of what these [special operation forces] teams would be working toward, and whether this would lead to an eventual air camapign to give a Syrian rebel group cover. They pretty quickly distanced themselves from that idea, saying that the idea ‘hypothetically’ is to commit guerrilla attacks, assassination campaigns, try to break the back of the Alawite forces, elicit collapse from within. There wouldn’t be a need for air cover, and they wouldn’t expect these Syrian rebels to be marching in columns anyway.“
2. Wait for or work towards (I’m agnostic on that) a reason for intervention such as ABC weapons or massacres:
„They dont believe air intervention would happen unless there was enough media attention on a massacre, like the Ghadafi move against Benghazi. They think the US would have a high tolerance for killings as long as it doesn’t reach that very public stage.“

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